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THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
AND THE LAW: A ROMAN CATHOLIC
PERSPECTIVE*
William Joseph Wagner**
In the next several years, the new reproductive technologies will, for bet-
ter or worse, affect the civil law governing society's most basic relationships
and the rights and duties that accompany them. As lawmakers deliberate
over the social choices required by technological developments in human
reproduction, the soundness of their decisions will depend on their under-
standing of the good that is at risk, and on their commitment to the law's
role in defending it. In view of the fundamental nature of the societal rela-
tionships implicated, who will deny that much currently depends on the
quality of lawmakers' decisions?
This article draws on the resources of the Roman Catholic tradition to
assist in establishing the basis for a sound legal response to the new technolo-
gies. In Roman Catholic circles, discussion thus far has been dedicated, in
the main, to placing the facts of the new technologies in view, and to stating
and applying principles relevant to their moral evaluation, but this article
will move from the moral implications of the new technologies per se, to the
question of society's response to them through the enactment of civil law.
The Vatican's Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on
the Dignity of Procreation stressed the importance of this latter question. Its
last section is entitled: "Moral and Civil Law: The Values and Moral Obli-
gations That Civil Legislation Must Respect and Sanction."' Concern with
the civil law, both in this article and in the Vatican Instruction, reflects the
exceptional sense of moral urgency which lawmakers, who face the rapidly
* © The Pope John XXIII Medical-Moral Research and Education Center. The text of
the present article derives from an address given to the Roman Catholic Bishops of North
America at their annual Dallas workshop, on February 4, 1988.
** B.A. 1975, University of California at Los Angeles; J.D. 1978, Yale University. Assis-
tant Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America.
1. CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT
FOR HUMAN LIFE IN ITS ORIGIN AND ON THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION: REPLIES To
CERTAIN QUESTIONS OF THE DAY, reprinted in POPE JOHN XXIII MEDICAL-MORAL RE-
SEARCH AND EDUCATION CENTER, ETHICS & MEDICS 20-21 (Supp. Apr. 1987) [hereinafter
VATICAN INSTRUCTION].
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expanding fact of the reproductive technologies, are now experiencing.' It
also reflects the intrinsic dynamic of Catholic moral principles. These affirm
the social nature of the human person and the essential role of law in the
pursuit of the common good.' Lawmakers need the assistance of the
Church, with its unmatched store of experience in the service of humanity,
and the Church needs to speak if it is to remain true to its vocation.
This article's goal is a generic understanding of those human goods which
the new reproductive technologies place at risk and which it falls within the
province of the civil law to protect. The article pursues this goal for the
purpose of justifying and prescribing the appropriate scope of the civil law's
intervention in this new area. The warrants supporting its conclusions de-
rive from the Roman Catholic tradition. They are, however, intended as
meaningful to others, and should to be of assistance in contributing to con-
sensus within society as a whole.
In addition to generic warrants and principles, the situation brooks no
delay in the formulation of concrete policy recommendations. Concrete rec-
ommendations are the focus of the public debate, and through them
Catholics are most effective in communicating their principled commitments
to others within the public realm. For this reason, my conclusions will have
the form of concrete public policy recommendations.
As far as the short scope of the article allows, I will account for how I
traverse the divide between primary moral warrants and concrete legal pro-
posals. Catholicism lays importance on careful distinctions at this level.
The Church acknowledges that the rational analysis and prudent judgment
of legal proposals presupposes, in addition to valid moral principles, knowl-
edge of the facts at issue, the broader characteristics of the culture, and the
structure of the existing system of positive law.' The proposals I advance
are intended as authentic expressions of Roman Catholic principles. They
are offered within what is intended as an accurate framework of knowledge
2. See, e.g., Alternative Reproductive Technologies: Implications for Families and Chil-
dren, Hearing Before the House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1987) [hereinafter Alternative Reproductive Technologies]; Surrogacy Arrange-
ments Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 2433 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation, Tourism,
and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. Sess.
(1987).
3. PASTORAL CONSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD § 74 (1965),
reprinted in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II at 283-85 (W. Abbot & J. Gallagher eds. 1966)
[herinafter PASTORAL CONSTITUTION].
4. Id.; JOHN XXIII, PACEM IN TERRIS § 67-69 (1963), reprinted in RENEWING THE
EARTH: CATHOLIC DOCUMENTS ON PEACE, JUSTICE AND LIBERATION 124, 141-42 (D.
O'Brien & T. Shannon eds. 1977) [hereinafter JOHN XXIII].
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about the new technologies and about the culture and legal system of the
United States.
I. SUMMARY: THE FACTS OF THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE MORAL EVALUATION
OF THE CHURCH
The Facts of the New Reproductive Technologies
An synthesis of the facts of the new reproductive technologies is a neces-
sary preliminary to my analysis. These facts lend themselves to synthesis in
two phases: 1) a description of the new technologies; and 2) a description of
the societal consequences which flow from the new technologies. Both sepa-
rate descriptions supply a needed foundation for the normative analysis
which the paper undertakes.
1. The New Technological Means of Reproduction
The new reproductive technologies with which the law is likely to be con-
cerned are those bringing about conception by "noncoital" means, i.e. by
means other than the conjugal act.5 In the classification of modes of
noncoital reproduction, methods which bring about conception within a wo-
man's body are distinguished from those which bring about conception at an
"extracorporeal" site. The former are known as "in vivo", and the latter as
"in vitro".6 Some of these techniques are already extensively practiced,
others have been employed with success in selected cases, yet others are, for
the time being, still only a hypothetical possibility.7
Of the in vivo means, the most firmly established is Artificial Insemination
5. The Catholic Church sees the distinction between "coital" and "noncoital" reproduc-
tion as morally significant. The Church teaches that technical "assistance" to conception
through coitus may be morally licit, but that technical substitution for coitus is not. Pius XII,
ALLOCUTION TO THE SECOND WORLD CONGRESS ON FERTILITY AND STERILITY 3 THE
POPE SPEAKS 194-95 (1956); see also VATICAN INSTRUCTION supra note 1, at 18. The public
policy discussion generally accepts "noncoital" human reproduction as a meaningful category
calling for a public policy response. See S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, REPRODUCTIVE GENETICS
AND THE LAW 223 (1987).
6. For an illustration of the use of these terms, see Robertson, Embryo, Families, and
Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 942,
949 (1986).
7. Because of the rapid advance of technology, policy must be formulated with respect to
projections about future states of affairs; otherwise, the policy may be incomplete or even irrel-
evant practically upon coming into existence. This explains, for example, the approach of the
Warnock Committee, which made recommendations about both existing and hypothetical
technologies. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SECURITY (U.K.), REPORT OF THE COM-
MITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY (M. Warnock Chair
1984) [hereinafter WARNOCK COMMITTEE].
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(AI). This method may employ gamete donation by the husband (AIH) or
by a donor (AID),' and it may be performed with or without the mediation
of physician.9 The woman conceiving by AID is usually, but not always
married.'o Where the AID conception is mediated by physician, gamete do-
nation is nearly always by a medical student in exchange for a fee.'" In the
United States, as many as 20,000 babies born each year have been conceived
by A.' 2 Since becoming widely practiced in about 1950, this method has
resulted in a total of more than 250,000 U.S. births.13
Another much newer, rapidly growing means of noncoital in vivo repro-
duction is Surrogate Motherhood. This procedure brings about in vivo con-
ception by AI in a woman other than the male gamete donor's spouse,
pursuant to an agreement that the woman will, at birth, transfer exclusive
custody of the resulting child to the donor and his spouse.' 4 Such arrange-
ments differ from AID, in that the genetic mother, and not father, is the
gamete donor, and she donates gestational "services" as well as gamete. The
first publicized case of surrogate motherhood in the United States occurred
nearly nine years ago.15 Over 800 babies have been born in the United States
pursuant to Surrogate Motherhood arrangements, including well known
"Baby M". 16 There has been a proliferation of brokers and professional in-
termediaries who structure and channel such arrangements.' 7
Unless either procedure incidentally includes treatment of male infertility,
AI and Surrogate Motherhood require no advanced technology. Both, in
fact, can be accomplished without mediation of a physician. Each year num-
bers of so-called "baster babies" are conceived in the United States, by
8. S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, supra note 5, at 227. Because AIH involves neither third-party
gamete donation nor an extracorporal embryo, it probably does not call for a civil law response
beyond the scope of the normal regulation of medical treatment. I, therefore, restrict my con-
crete policy recommendations concerning Al to AID.
9. Robertson, supra, note 6, at 1004-05.
10. B. ASHLEY & K. O'ROURKE, HEALTH CARE ETHICS 286 (2d ed. 1982).
11. S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, supra note 5, at 228.
12. Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproductive Technologies, 70
A.B.A. J, 50, 50 (1984). Some estimate a somewhat lower figure. Keane, Legal Problems of
Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 SILL. U. L.J. 147, 148.
13. S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, supra note 5, at 227.
14. Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies 96
YALE L.J. 187, 188 n.5 (1986).
15. Surrogacy Arrangements Act, supra note 2 (Testimony of Richard Levin, President of
Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc.).
16. As of 1985, an estimated 600 surrogate births had occurred. Katz, Surrogate Mother-
hood and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. (1986). At present, an
estimated 100 births occur a year. Reproductive Technology Debated, Wash. Post, Sept. 9,
1986, at 13. The total to date should be well over 800.
17. Krause, Artificial Conception: Legislative Approaches, 19 FAM. L.Q. 185, 199 (1985).
Krause points out that these middlemen reap most of the profit in the surrogate arrangement.
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means of home-induced artificial inseminations. 18 The explanation of AI
and Surrogate Motherhood is apparently connected more with social change
than technological innovation.
A new, as yet little-used in vivo procedure of noncoital reproduction, re-
quiring advanced technology, is Surrogate Embryo Transfer (SET).19 The
first live birth following SET occurred four years ago. 20 The procedure en-
tails in vivo conception by AID; subsequent removal the resulting embryo by
lavage; and Embryo Transfer (ET) to the womb of another for gestation.2
The intended gestator is generally presumed to be the infertile spouse of the
male gamete donor. Along with her husband, she usually intends to have
custody of the resulting child. 2 If the procedure were varied to include AIH
or marital intercourse rather than AID, it could be used to allow a fertile
woman, who is unable or unwilling to carry a child, to engage another wo-
man to gestate her child, while intending to regain custody of the child at
birth. This latter arrangement can, more aptly than Surrogate Motherhood,
be termed "womb rental".
Turning from in vivo to in vitro procedures for noncoital reproduction, the
simple case of In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) is conception in vitro by AIH,
with ET to the genetic mother for gestation.23 The first live birth resulting
from this use of IVF occurred ten years ago. 24 There have now been over
2,000 IVF births worldwide. 5 Under present circumstances, the woman
gestating a baby conceived by IVF generally is both genetic mother and the
spouse of the male donor. But, IVF can be completed by means of AID, so
that the male gamete donor may be other than the woman's spouse.26
IVF can also be varied so that the donation of the ovum (Ovum Donation)
for IVF conception results in ET to another for gestation.27 If the transfer is
to the spouse of the male gamete donor, then custody of the resulting child
will, in general, be intended for the gestator and her husband, the genetic
18. See, e.g., Artificial Insemination and AIDS, Wash. Post, Health Mag, .Jan. 5, 1988, at
17, col. 1) (discussing the self-administered artificial insemination of Lesley Northrup, an Epis-
copal priest).
19. S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, supra note 5 at 230.
20. Infertile Woman Has Baby Through Embryo Transfer, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1984, at
16.
21. S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, supra note 5, at 230.
22. Id.; Robertson, supra note 6, at 950-51; WARNOCK COMMITTEE, supra note 7, at 39.
23. WARNOCK COMMITTEE, supra note 7, at 29.
24. The baby, Louise Brown, was born on July 25, 1978. D. DEMARCO, IN MY
MOTHER'S WOMB 143 (1987).
25. Id.
26. This would be the case where the couple's infertility has the husband's infertility as a
contributing cause.
27. WARNOCK COMMITTEE, supra note 7, at 35.
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father. In such case, the ovum donation is more strictly analogous to AID,
than is either Surrogate Motherhood or SET. If the transfer is to a woman
who is neither the ovum donor nor the wife of the sperm donor, the transac-
tion is part of an Embryo Donation and custody of the resulting child is
probably intended for a couple with whom the child will have no genetic
relationship.2"
In other cases, the ovum donor might herself wish custody, at birth, of the
child resulting from IVF and ET to another. In this event, she would pre-
sumably also be the spouse of the male gamete donor. The woman receiving
the embryo transfer (ET) and gestating the child would be genetically unre-
lated to the child and maritally unrelated to its father. This arrangement,
again more aptly than Surrogate Motherhood, would be described as "womb
rental".29
IVF, in any of these applications, can be combined with the use of Frozen
Embryos. The first live birth following the freezing of the embryo occurred
two years ago. 30 Freezing the embryo permits delay between IVF and ET.
This delay can be utilized for the convenience of the candidate for gestation,
whether the child's genetic mother or another; for efficiency in the proce-
dure; for avoidance of medical risks; or for the occurrence of brokerage func-
tions a.3 During the period of delay, the frozen embryo is maintained in an
Embryo Bank or "storage authority.",32
A hypothetical additional technological means of reproduction is IVF
combined with in vitro gestation. This hypothetical possibility, which would
result in the "test tube baby" of Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, is
known as ECTOGENESIS.3 3 Other hypothetical possibilities include asexual
reproduction through CLONING, NUCLEUS SUBSTITUTION, and PARTHENO-
GENESIS. 34 These methods would be employed for more complete mastery
over the genetic make-up of individual embryos. 35
2. A Description of the Societal Consequences of the New
Reproductive Technologies
As will be shown below, Catholicism understands the law as especially
28. Id. at 39; Robertson, supra note 6, at 950.
29. Robertson, supra note 6, at 950 n.34.
30. Note, Frozen Embryo: Moral, Social and Legal Implications 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1079,
1082 n.20 (1986); First Baby Born of Frozen Embryo, N.Y. Times, April 11, 1984, at A16, col.
4.
31. Id. at 1083-86.
32. WARNOCK COMMITTEE, supra note 7, at 55.




concerned with the consequences that human actions have for the social or-
der. The Vatican Instruction rightly notes that the societal consequences of
the new reproductive technology cannot yet fully be foreseen, one reason
being that the response of the civil law is, for the most part, still pending,
and that this response will be critical in deciding the extent and nature of
such consequences. Nonetheless, two parallel sets of consequences or poten-
tial consequences flowing from the practice of the new reproductive technol-
ogies are already clear. They are: 1) the emergence of unprecedented risks
to the embryo; and 2) the breakdown and redefinition of familial relation-
ships. These two parallel effects of the new reproductive technologies can be
considered separately.
Unprecedented Risks to the Embryo
All in vitro and some in vivo methods of noncoital reproduction expose the
embryo to a period of "extracorporeal" existence.36 Extracorporeal exist-
ence exposes the human embryo to unprecedented risk during a critical
phase of development. In part, the threatened harms are physical: the ex-
tracorporeal embryo is subject to harm through accident; nontherapeutic
(eugenic) treatment; nontherapeutic experimentation; commercial exploita-
tion; and planned destruction (wastage).37 Existing experimental and com-
mercial uses to which embryos could be put open up possible vistas of
routine mass destruction.
Threatened harms also include ones of an intangible kind to the moral
dignity of the embryo. Because it is deprived of the moral, legal, and physi-
cal protection of a sheltering relationship with the gestational mother, the
embryo is exposed to the risk of fundamental removal from personal rela-
tionship with others, and may even be treated as a form of chattel. It may be
placed in long-term frozen storage.39 It may be sold as property possibly for
gestation, but also for experimentation or commercial exploitation.' If it
dies during its extracorporeal existence, its remains may be sold for these
latter purposes.4
When larger societal trends are compared, the vulnerability of the ex-
tracorporeal embryo to physical injury and destruction converges with the
36. Smith, Intimations of Life: Extracorporeality and the Law, 21 GONZ. L. REV. 395
(1986).
37. VATICAN INSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 10-13.
38. WARNOCK COMMIT"EE, supra note 7, at 71.
39. Id. at 54.
40. Robertson, supra note 6, at 1021; WARNOCK COMMITTEE, supra note 7, at 71.
41. Andrews, My Body, My Property, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28, 32 (1986).
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similar vulnerability of the aborted embryo42 or fetus and the patient who is
denied appropriate treatment or care, because of another's assessment of the
"quality" of his life.43 The moral vulnerability of the extracorporeal embryo
to treatment as "chattel" converges with a distinct set of trends, including
proposals to utilize living anencephalic babies as a source of organs for trans-
plant' and to use living aborted fetuses as a source of organs for transplant
or for nontherapeutic experimentation.45 This second trend, more funda-
mentally than the first, subjugates one human being for the uses of another.
Breakdown and Redefinition of Familial Relationships
Familial status as "parent", "child of a parent", and "spouse" has, until
now, been fundamental for social identity and for establishing core legal
rights and duties not generally subject to economic markets or routine gov-
ernmental limitation. 6 Prior to the emergence of the new technologies, at-
tribution of family status and associated rights was relatively simple in
United States' society and law. Even without more direct reference to the
moral order, this fact contributed greatly to society's stability by giving the
law a predictable basis for identifying persons who qualified for parental and
spousal rights and duties.47
The legal marriage ceremony conferred the status of spouse.48
Nonmarital monogamous sexual relationships, perhaps, provided a basis for
social identity, but were not legally cognizable as alternatives to marriage.49
42. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc. 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists, 106A S.Ct. 2169 (1986).
43. See the quality-of-life formula, which was at issue in Johnson v. Sullivan, No. Civ. -85-
2434A Western Dist. of Oklahoma (Filed Oct. 3, 1985), cited by Destro, Quality-of-Life Ethics
and Constitutional Jurisprudence: The Demise of Natural Rights and Equal Protection for the
Disabled and Incompetent 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y. 126 (1986).
44. Infants Without Brains: Should Parents of an Anencephalic Baby Have the Right to
Donate the Infant's Organs, Wash. Post, Health Mag., Jan. 26, 1988, at 16.
45. "It has also been charged that some abortionists are performing procedures that in-
crease the risk to women in order to obtain live fetuses for research purposes." The Selling of
Body Parts, THE NAT. L. J. Dec. 7, 1985, at 33, col. 1.
46. With respect to economic markets, familial status is protected by nonenforcement of
contract. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 331, 341-47 (1982). With respect to govern-
mental limitation, familial status is protected by implicit constitutional guarantee. Pierce v.
Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
47. Note, supra note 14, at 187.
48. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 90 (1888).
49. Even at its furthest reach, the recognition of "nonmarital relationships," as a forum
within which joint property and restitutionary rights may arise, has not failed to distinguish
such relationships from the institution of marriage upon which "the structure of society itself
largely depends" and which the court does not intend to derogate, Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.
3d 660, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 557 P. 2d 106 (1977). It is interesting to further note that no
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Among its two paradigmatic meanings, "spouse" meant "parents of a
child", or persons who had joined with the prospect of becoming "parents of
a child". 5" Maternal status was established by birth, and although paternal
status was complicated by problems of proof because no publicly ascertain-
able event such as birth exists to prove the father's genetic link to his child,
the usual definition of legal paternity was also simple: genetic fatherhood."1
There were simple rules for the identification of each of a child's parents.
Rearing relationships, and the rights and duties accompanying them, were
assumed to flow from genetic lineage.52 Where paternity was uncertain or
marriages broke down, rearing tended to be associated with the mother, who
was the one certainly identifiable parent.5 3 Adoption was the exception, but
this practice was based on the extraordinary waiver or parens patriae termi-
nation of the genetic parent's rights and duties.54  As they become preva-
lent, the new reproductive technologies cause the disintegration of this stable
matrix of rules for identifying parent, child, and spouse. Most of these pro-
cedures involve the donation of gametes by at least one party who is not a
spouse, and to that extent they are "extramarital". 55 The spouses are not
together the genetic parents of the child, and the parents of the child are not
legally or socially spouses. As a result, such procedures undermine the para-
digmatic social and legal definition of spouse. This loss of meaning is com-
pounded when the civil law positively enforces an extramarital procreative
arrangement in contravention of existing marriages, as occurred at the trial
level, in the Mary Beth Whitehead case.56
The new reproductive technologies likewise cause a breakdown of the sta-
ble definition of "parent." These technologies separate genetic, gestational,
award ultimately was made in the Marvin case. Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 877,
176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (1981).
50. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
51. Note, supra note 48, at 187; H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY
105 (1971); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Marriage creates a presumption of legiti-
macy which may lead to the identification of a man other than the genetic father as the legal
father. Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1975).
52. This has been called the "presumption of biology." Note, supra note 48, at 190, but it
is better described as the meaning of lineage, S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, supra note 7, at 224.
53. Note, supra note 14, at 187 n.2.
54. 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
55. Extramarital procedures include AID, Ovum Donation, Surrogate Motherhood, the
standard case of Surrogate Embryo Transfer. The donation of "gestational services" alone is
not extramarital in the same sense. It does, however, undermine the parent-child bond, by
yielding a primary and exclusive nurturing relationship to another adult during the most cru-
cial developmental phase of the child's life.
56. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super.Ct.Ch.Div. 1987).
1988]
46 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 4:37
and rearing roles." The rearing role may be connected with either the ge-
netic or the gestational role, or it may be set up in opposition to both.5" No
one role, nor any combination of them, can provide a sure basis for identify-
ing the parent of a child or attaching rights and duties to that status.59 By
causing the breakdown of the paradigmatic meanings of spouse and parent,
the new reproductive technologies undermine the traditional basis for the
assignment of core legal rights and duties.
This breakdown in the meaning of core societal relationships has been
matched by the corresponding emergence, under the new reproductive re-
gime, of an alternative basis for assigning rights and duties. This basis rests
in individual autonomy, which is said to have the power to structure shifting
procreative and rearing forms through the law of contract.' The use of
contract in this context requires the reification of one or both of the repro-
ductive partners and of the child conceived. 61 It has been proposed, for ex-
ample, that the embryo have the status of property subject to sale by
contract.6 2 It has also been proposed that the surrogate mother be subject to
coercion specifically enforcing the use of her body by third parties.6 a
In this impersonal and changing framework, third-party brokerage and
technical institutions have begun to emerge to provide the stable forum, pre-
viously offered exclusively by the family, and still necessary for the initiation
and completion of reproductive arrangements." The rights of these third-
parties are also assigned by contract. Their rights are, thus, potentially
equal or superior to those of the genetic and gestational parents. As a conse-
quence of the emergence of contract and third-party mediating institutions,
society faces the possible far-reaching commercialization of fundamental
procreative and rearing relationships.65
When larger trends are consulted, the consequences of the new technolo-
gies for rights, status, and relationship within families converge somewhat
with trends apparent in rising rates of nonmarital cohabitation, illegitimacy,
57. S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, supra note 5, at 223 citing Robertson, Procreative Liberty and
the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405 (1983).
58. Robertson, supra note 6, at 1002.
59. S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, supra note 5, at 238.
60. Robertson, supra note 6, at 960.
61. Id at 1026.
62. Andrews, supra note 41, at 33.
63. See recommendation of ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION: REPORT ON HUMAN
ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION AND RELATED MATTERS (1985) cited in S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS,
supra, note 5, at 237.
64. Krause, supra note 17, at 199-200.
65. See generally Robertson, supra note 6, at 1001-23 (describing possible patterns of "col-
laborative" reproduction structured by contract).
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divorce, and parental and spousal abandonment.66
The Catholic Moral Evaluation of the New Reproductive Technologies and
Their Societal Consequences
The Catholic Church has applied traditional principles to reach a definite
moral evaluation of the new reproductive technologies. The recent Instruc-
tion of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith employs three
such principles. They are as follows: 1) the moral dignity of the human
person as inviolable from conception until death;67 2) human procreation as
morally exclusive to marriage; 68 and 3) the moral inseparability of the uni-
tive and procreative aspects of the conjugal act.69 I will summarize the con-
crete norms, which the Instruction, I believe correctly, assumes to flow from
these three stated principles. My goal is not to explain how these conclu-
sions flow from their premises.70 In the context, it is simply to state the
concrete Catholic moral position, as a necessary benchmark for my treat-
ment of law and policy.
1. The Moral Dignity of the Human Person is Inviolable From the
Moment of Conception
The Church teaches that the personal dignity and rights of the human
being begin at conception, and that they continue, at least while juridical
innocence remains, until the moment of death.7 t Since the recognition of
personhood in another is nothing other than the acknowledgment of a neces-
sary moral obligation of equal regard to others like ourselves, personhood is
not contingent on the concession by any temporal institution or even on the
conscious claims of the other. The Church teaches that there is no factual
basis for morally justifying the denial of such recognition from the moment
of conception.72
66. Id. at 1001, n.207.
67. VATICAN INSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 9.
68. Id. at 14-15.
69. Id. at 16.
70. The Catholic understanding of moral reasoning presupposes both the authority of
Scripture and the ecclesiastical Magisterium and the search for reasoned justifications. The
concrete moral norms considered here are ones taught by the Magisterium. Their reasoned
justification is, in the Catholic view, both possible and necessary, but it is a task far exceeding
the scope of the present article. For one contemporary approach, see J. FINNIs, FUNDAMEN-
TALS OF ETHICS (1983).
71. VATICAN INSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 9.
72. Id. at 10-11; SACRED CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLA-
RATION ON PROCURED ABORTION, 66 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 730, §§ 12-13 at 738
(1974). The Church's public policy position does not commit itself to a particular philosophi-
cal assertion about the moment of ensoulment or the character of the transition to personhood,
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On this ground, actions inflicting, or undertaken in contemplation of in-
flicting direct physical harm to the embryo are excluded as immoral. Ac-
cording to the Vatican Instruction, such moral wrongs include: procured
abortion of an embryo; the culling and wasting of embryos; subjection of the
embryo to prenatal diagnosis, with a conditional intention of aborting; sub-
jection of the embryo to disproportionate risk, in medical treatment; or sub-
jection of the embryo to nontherapeutic experimentation.7
On the same ground, nonphysical assaults on the embryo's integrity and
dignity are also morally excluded. In the present context, such wrongs are
said by the Church to include: eugenic selection; nontherapeutic manipula-
tion of the embryo's genetic endowment; asexual conception; conception
with a nongestational purpose; freezing even for therapeutic purposes; artifi-
cial or animal gestation; and failure to show respect for embryotic remains.7"
In addition, respect is owed to the process which generates the human per-
son, even when a person may not be present. On this ground, the conception
of animal-human hybrids is excluded."
In sum, personal respect for the embryo from conception provides a deon-
tological basis for a negative moral evaluation of the actions which deliber-
ately cause the unprecedented risks to the embryo, described above as a
societal consequence of the new technologies.76
2. Human Procreation Ought to Occur Exclusively Within Marriage
A second moral principle, which the Church has applied in evaluating the
new reproductive technologies, holds that unity and stability of marriage
provides the only morally acceptable forum for procreation.7 7 The exclu-
siveness of this requirement follows from the human dignity of the child.
78
Since extramarital and nonmarital procreative arrangements violate this
principle, all the new reproductive technologies I have described, with the
exceptions of AIH and the simple case of intramarital IVF, are, according to
but teaches as a moral matter that withholding equal regard from one who may in fact be
present as a person is unjustifiable. See Johnstone, The Moral Status of the Embryo in TEST
TUBE BABIES: A GUIDE TO MORAL QUESTIONS, PRESENT TECHNIQUES AND FUTURE POS-
SIBILITIES 49-56 (W. Walters & P. Singer eds. 1984).
73. WARNOCK COMMITFEE, supra note 7, at 11-14.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 13. One- to two-celled human-hamster hybrids are routinely created for the
purpose of testing the penetrability of human sperm. Id. at 70.
76. The Church's position does not entail a summing of negative consequences. It starts
with the principle of the moral dignity of the human person and excludes actions which violate
this principle. The violation of the principle illuminates what is morally offensive about the
harms described as consequences above.
77. WARNOCK COMMITTEE, supra note 7, at 14.
78. Id. at 15.
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the Vatican Instruction, morally excluded.79 Such arrangements rely on
gamete donations by third-parties, even when they contemplate custody by a
particular marital couple. The Church's negative moral judgment obtains,
therefore even when the physical and moral integrity of the embryo is other-
wise respected.80
This Catholic moral principle permits a negative deontologically based
moral judgment on those deliberate actions, associated with the new repro-
ductive technologies, which bring about the breakdown and redefinition of
familial rights, status, and relationship, described above.8"
3. The Connection Between the Unitive and Procreative Aspects Of the
Conjugal Act Is Morally Inviolable
As Paul VI's prophetic encyclical Humanae Vitae taught and the Catholic
tradition holds, the natural connection between the unitive and procreative
aspects of the conjugal act is morally inseparable.8 2 The Church considers
all noncoital reproductive technologies contradict this principle, because
they substitute technical intervention for the conjugal act.83 Thus, this final
principle excludes even AIH and IVF as acceptable moral options.84 In
breaking the unity between the marital act and procreation, noncoital means
of reproduction are said to assert dominion over the origin and destiny of the
child conceived, in a way that does not fully respect the child's dignity or the
dignity of the marital relationship as the loving service of God's creative
will.5
The Instruction notes that these methods do not share in the degree of
ethical negativity found in extramarital techniques of noncoital reproduc-
tion, but, for the reasons stated, still excludes them.86 In the Catholic view,
lack of respect for this principle is associated with the negative societal con-
sequences of the new reproductive technologies, in a way which is less direct,
but, perhaps, more fundamental than are the other two principles
mentioned."7
79. Id. at 14-18.
80. Id. at 17.
81. See supra note 76.
82. PAUL VI, HUMANAE VITAE, 60 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 481, §§ 12 at 488-89
(1968).
83. VATICAN INSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 16-18.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 17.
86. Id. at 18.
87. The harms associated with the new reproductive technologies can be defined as a
breakdown in the respect for the marriage bond and for the life and integrity of the embryo.
By definition, these harms represent violations of the other two principles discussed. They do
not, by definition, however, make direct reference to this third principle, although, at a more
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The Church has expressed compassion for those on whom the existential
weight of these concrete moral norms falls. The Church wishes to console
and reassure those childless couples who subjectively experience the
Church's norms as an added wound beyond childlessness itself-a perceived
condemnation of the profoundly human desire for a child."8 It also ad-
dresses its concern to the researcher, who fears that compliance with the
norms advanced by the Church will too quickly foreclose essential knowl-
edge in biology and genetics.89 The Church's compassion, however, is
grounded in an unqualified commitment to human dignity making its norms
in this area exceptionless. 9
II. CATHOLIC PRINCIPLES FOR JUSTIFYING AND PRESCRIBING THE
SCOPE OF CIVIL LAW INTERVENTION
The new reproductive technologies call for acts not morally justifiable, but
are these morally unjustified acts among those that the civil law ought to
restrain? What the moral order excludes and what the civil order ought to
prohibit are, as is well recognized in the Roman Catholic tradition, two sepa-
rate questions.91 Granting that the moral order grounds the legitimacy of
law, neither abstract moral principles nor concrete moral norms alone are
enough to specify the law's content. In order to justify and prescribe the
content of law, abstract moral principles governing human action generally,
such as those just discussed, must be mediated by the jurisprudential princi-
ples that govern the question of common action undertaken to order the
good of the whole community.92
Public opinion is virtually unanimous in holding that the new reproduc-
tive technologies require a decisive legal response, but judgments differ about
the precise nature of the ends and means which ought to be pursued. Some
hold the position that the new technologies are good or at least not the kind
of harm that the law should seek to restrain.93 These voices may hold that
fundamental level, it is arguable that the choice to disrespect the inseparability of the procrea-
tive and unitive meaning in the sexual act opens the door to a lack of appreciation for the
moral meaning of both the marriage bond and the life of the embryo.
88. VATICAN INSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 19.
89. Id. at 7-8.
90. The Church's insight into the value of the human person is grounded in its faith in the
human person's transcendent source and destiny. In addition to existing philosophical
grounds, the Church's confidence in its ability to teach exceptionless moral norms with author-
ity is based in its faith in divine revelation. Id. at 9.
91. J.C. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 155-74 (1960).
92. T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I.II. Q. 95; VATICAN INSTRUCTION, supra note
1, at 20.
93. See, e.g., L. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS: THE CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO THE
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the law should do no more than regulate the technologies for efficiency, pre-
dictability, and the health of the adult participants.9
Most agree that the new technologies entail harm." The Church perceives
that such harm has the character of a profound injury to human dignity. On
what theoretical basis can such harm be said to be of the kind which the law
ought to prevent, and what preventative means ought the law to employ in
countering it? These jurisprudential questions must be answered, before spe-
cific policy recommendations can be reached.
Applicable Catholic Doctrine
The Catholic tradition embraces a specific body of doctrine which assists
in answering these questions. The Congregation's Instruction makes a suc-
cinct reference to Catholic jurisprudential doctrine, when, in its final section,
it cites paragraph 7 of Dignitatis Hurnanae.96 This conciliar pronouncement
on the role of the civil law is the corner stone of contemporary Catholic
approaches to law. 97 Pope John XXIII's Encyclical Pacem in Terris" and
the Second Vatican Council's Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes99 are
of particular assistance for defining the broader underpinnings of the mind of
the Church, as it is expressed in Dignitatis Humanae 7. The teaching of
these documents provides a foundation for both generic and specific legal
recommendations concerning the new reproductive technologies. The fol-
lowing account is intended as a synthesis of the position found in these mag-
isterial documents.
In the Catholic view, the civil law's moral justification is ultimately
grounded in the nature of the human person, as a social being who must
pursue the good in community with others."Ic Life in community requires
an ordering, which in at least one fundamental respect can only be guaran-
NEWEST INFERTILITY TREATMENTS INCLUDING IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, ARTIFICIAL IN-
SEMINATION AND SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1984).
94. In this view, negative restrictions should be limited to the purposes of effciency, pre-
dictability and the health of the adult participants. It should not be overlooked, however that
this view tends to hold that the law should be modified to provide for the positive enforcement
of nonmarital procreative contract arrangements against the objections of genetic parents and
birth mother. Robertson, supra note 6, at 960-62.
95. Krause, supra note 17, at 185-88. As Krause points out, the challenge is rationally to
identify true harms and distinguish them from understandable but nonrational fears.
96. VATICAN INSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 20 n.60.
97. J.C. MURRAY, Introduction to DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Dignitatis
Humanae) in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 672-74 [hereinafter DECLARATION ON RELI-
GIOUS FREEDOM] (W. Abbott & J. Gallagher eds. 1966).
98. JOHN XXIII, supra note 4, at 124-70 (1977).
99. PASTORAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at 199.
100. Id. at 284.
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teed by civil law.'' This fact gives the law its legitimacy. The law retains its
legitimacy, as long as its end remains the ordering of society to the common
good. 102
The Church understands the common good, which is the justifying moral
ground and guide of the civil law, to be "the sum of those conditions of
social life by which individuals, families, and groups can achieve their own
fulfillment in a thorough and ready way." 113 The fulfillment which the
Church here envisions is the "integral perfection" of the human person in
relation to a "hierarchy of values". 1" These values include, and thus, the
law must promote, the bodily needs of the community, including the mate-
rial means for meaningful human life and action1"5 and the absence of civil
strife.106 But, they also include moral needs:
The order which prevails in society is by nature moral. Grounded
as it is in truth, it must function according to the norms of justice,
it should be inspired and perfected by mutual love, and finally it
should be brought to an ever more refined and human balance in
freedom. 107
The law can be morally justified, only if it also orders the community in
relation to these transcendental values.108 In the Catholic view, it is in rela-
tion to such values that the human person can thrive and reach his or her
"integral perfection."
The Role of Justice
Truth, charity and freedom help ground the civil law's legitimacy, but
justice is the value serving as primary norm for evaluating the legitimacy of a
law or legal system. As Pacem in Terris states, justice is the norm which
governs the "function" of law."o The paramount obligation of the law is to
provide justice for its citizens.'1 0 It meets this obligation by defending the
rights and adjudicating justly between the claims of citizens."' In doing so,
it must be evenhanded, providing its protection equally to all." 2 Where the
101. DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 97, § 7 at 685-87.
102. PASTORAL CONSTITUTION supra note 3, § 74 at 284.
103. Id.
104. JOHN XXIII, supra note 4, §§ 57-58 at 138.
105. Id. § 64 at 139-40.
106. DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 97, § 7 at 685-87.
107. JOHN XXIII, supra note 4, § 37 at 133.
108. Id. § 38 at 133.
109. Id. § 37 at 133.
110. Id. §60 at 139.
111. Id. § 62 at 139. DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 97, § 7 at 685-
87.
112. JOHN XXIII, supra note 4, § 65 at 140.
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law loses its commitment to doing justice for persons or to administering
justice with an even hand, it suffers a fatal wound to its own legitimacy. As
the recent Instruction states: "The very foundations of a State based on law
are undermined."
'' 1 3
The Basis of Rights
It should be apparent that the civil law can do justice, only if it has a basis
for assigning rights. What are rights? Some may be contingent on political
agreement, but the Church recognizes that others have a deeper basis.
Some, for example, are a function of a basic right to participate meaningfully
in the life of the political community."1 4 Others belong to a person merely
by virtue of his natural dignity as an individual person. This latter kind of
right includes the right to life and respect for one's physical integrity.11 5
Yet other rights belong to a person by reason of his or her status within a
family. Rights and duties flowing from familial status are not derived from
any political choice, but rather are fundamental to the nature of the human
person."' The state has a role in coordinating family relationships and in
promoting them, but it does not create them.1 17 In sum, the rights that it is
the law's most fundamental duty to promote and to defend derive from a
status and have a core content, which the state has no authority to alter. As
we consider them here, they flow from the nature of the person, as individual
and as related to others in a family."'
On this basis, those moral rights to personal life and integrity and to mem-
bership in an integral family, which account for the moral critique of the
new reproductive technologies discussed above, can be said to have, as well,
an unalterable bearing on the content of legal rights. The scope of legal
rights must be justified and prescribed in relation to these same moral
rights.'19
Although legal rights must be morally grounded, their recognition may
extend only as far as the law's particular function warrants. The scope of
moral rights, by contrast, is coextensive with human interaction. Many
moral injustices are, therefore, beyond the competency of the law to prevent
113. VATICAN INSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 20.
114. PASTORAL CONSTITUTION supra note 3, § 75 at 285-87.
115. JOHN XXIII, supra note 4, §§ 9,11 at 126.
116. DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 97, § 5 at 683: PASTORAL CON-
STITUTION supra note 3, § 25 at 224,
117. JOHN XXIII, supra note 4, § 62 at 139.
118. Id. § 9 at 126.
119. It is on this basis, rather than on the simple basis of moral objection that the Church
calls for legal restrictions on aspects of the new reproductive technologies. VATICAN IN-
STRUCTION, supra note 1, at 20-21.
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or correct. One limit on the function of the civil law in pursuit of justice
arises from the law's secondary moral orientation to other aspects of the
common good: truth, charity, and freedom.120 The value of freedom, in
particular, requires that the law pursue justice according to the mean and no
further 12' .
According to Dignitatis Humanae 7, the mean of justice in relation to
freedom is established by the requirements of the public order.122 In defining
particular legal rights and in deciding how far to go in enforcing them, the
lawmaker must always ask whether a moral right or its application, when
based in justice, is of a character to matter to the public order.
An aspect of justice which inextricably concerns the public order concerns
the recognition of status, a question of not "what", but "who". Who shall
have the status to demand rights and to be charged with duties? Where
justice, in the moral sense, recognizes a status as morally constitutive of the
social order, it is, by definition, a matter of what Dignitatis Humanae calls
the public order and must be recognized as giving rise to legal rights.
123
When one says that the law must recognize the moral status of per-
sonhood and of relations within the family, one is claiming that these reali-
ties are constitutive of the social order. As the Vatican Instruction puts it,
they are "constitutive elements of civil society."'1 2' Their basis in morality
must, always and everywhere, translate into recognition under law. In the
Catholic view, no deference even to freedom or truth or charity is, in princi-
ple, capable of requiring that such recognition ever be denied.
125
The scope of substantive rights accompanying the recognition of status is
admittedly a separate question. On this level, the law must moderate the
extent of its reach, in keeping with its commitment to fundamental values
other than justice, such as freedom. Still, even on this level certain mini-
mums must be satisfied. With respect to rights flowing from the status of
person, the right to life and respect for one's bodily integrity is within the
minimum recognition necessary, as United States law agrees. Our tort and
criminal law would never, for example, permit the harms to jeopardize the
120. JOHN XXIII, supra note 4, § 37 at 133.
121. DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 97, § 7 at 685-87.
122. Id. § 8 at 687.
123. Id.
124. VATICAN INSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 20.
125. "Society has the right to defend itself against possible abuses committed on pretext of
freedom. ... It is the special duty of government to provide this protection .... Its action is to
be controlled by juridical norms which are in conformity with the objective moral order.
These norms arise out of the need for effective safeguard of the rights of all citizens." DECLA-
RATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 97, § 7 at 686-87.
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adult, which currently threaten the extracorporeal embryo. 126 The argu-
ment in connection with the embryo concerns, then, not the reach of the
right to life and physical integrity, but entitlement to the status of per-
sonhood. As the Instruction teaches, the embryo is morally a person, since
there is no basis in fact which would justify our withholding from it equal
regard as another like ourselves.1 27 It follows that the embryo must have
personal status under the law. Any distinction made among living embryos
based on genetic qualities, sex, or stage of development constitute invidious
discrimination contradicting the law's legitimating orientation to the moral
value of justice. As a person, the embryo deserves the same substantive pro-
tection received by others.
Because the Church teaches that status flowing from relations within the
family also is constitutive of the social order, this element of status, too,is a
matter of the public order, and must be recognized as a nondefeasible basis
for assigning legal rights and duties. The status of "Parent," "Child of Par-
ent," and "Spouse" are all moral bases beyond the status of simple per-
sonhood, which the law is obligated to recognize in assigning rights. In
addition, the complex of status relationships known as marriage and the
family is morally entitled to legal recognition as having a group status rele-
vant to the coordination of rights and duties flowing from the subsidiary
aspects of generational relationships. 2 '
Substantive Legal Protection of the Familial Rights Affirmed
in Catholic Doctrine
The civil law has, until now, recognized the normative status of marriage
and the family, as an integral unit. It has done so primarily through grant-
126. The torts of battery and negligent injury or wrongful death come to mind, as do the
crimes of assault, manslaughter, and murder.
127. The Instruction, like the DECLARATION ON PROCURED ABORTION, supra note 72,
says that the juridical recognition of personhood is morally required from the moment of con-
ception, even though personhood in the sense of ensoulment might not yet be present. The
possible presence of a person means that restraint by others is morally required, without proof
that a person in the transcendent sense is present. In other words, with conception, the burden
of proof shifts to those who wish to assert that no person is present. If conception is defined as
a process, the moral obligation of respect commences when the process begins.
128. The United Nations' Declaration of Human Rights provides in Article 16 that "[t]he
family is the natural and fundamental group unit in society and is entitled to protection by
society and the State." UNITED NATIONS, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
1948. The VATICAN INSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 20, speaks of the "rights of the family."
In our legal system "rights" are generally recognized when asserted by "legal persons" which
means individuals and corporate organizations constructively treated as persons under the law.
How is the law to recognize the "rights" of an entity that is not an individual and is not a
constructive legal person? It would probably be through recognition of rights in individuals
who share in the corporate status of family member.
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ing monogamous marriage an exclusive role as the choice-based norm which
coordinates the status rights of spouses, parents, and children.' 29 This grant
is given effect, largely, by denying recognition to contracts which attempt to
compete with this coordinating function. The law has, until now, deemed
such contracts unenforceable and void as against public policy. 13° In addi-
tion, the civil law has traditionally taken positive steps to foster the strength
and effectiveness of families in providing for the welfare of their members,
while denying such assistance to alternative domestic arrangements which
compete with the family for social resources.I31 Reinforcement of the family
through the use of direct penalties leveled against alternative forms of en-
gendering and rearing children is inadmissable, because the hardships of the
penalty would tend to flow through to the children.
132
For confirmation that elements of familial status are a matter of the public
order, consider once again the societal disorder which the new reproductive
technologies cause for the identification of the adult who has the right and
duty to raise a particular child. The state cannot, in a given case, even iden-
tify with certainty which adult has the duty to raise a particular child. No
one suggests that this disorder is tolerable. The question is only how order
or the semblance of order will be re-established. Some authorities are willing
to rely on concepts of contract obligation as an alternative basis for estab-
lishing predictability and order in this area. In Canada, the Report of the
Ontario Law Reform Commission made such a recommendation concerning
surrogate motherhood. It suggested that the civil law ought to enforce and
supervise the formation of surrogacy contracts. 1
33
However, the right to recognition under law, as "parent," "child of par-
ent" and even, to a diminished extent, "spouse" should not be considered
contingent on the existence of an integral marriage or family structure.
When the institution of the integral family dissolves or never completes its
formation, as today unfortunately too often is the case, each of these ele-
ments of moral status survives in its own way. The state simply has the
129. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). One instance of the coordinating effect
of marriage is the presumption of legitimacy of children which it creates. Beck v. Beck, 304
N.E.2d 541 (Ind. App. 1973).
130. FARNSWORTH, supra note 46, at 341-47.
131. Traditionally, the law protected the welfare of legitimate children at the expense of
illegitimate children. This approach has been struck down by the United States Supreme Court
in a series of cases beginning in the late 1960s, as a violation of equal protection. Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). Tax advantages were removed by the Revenue Act of 1969.
Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN.L. REV. 1389 (1975).
132. Even indirect approaches have been struck down by the United States Supreme Court
as a violation of equal protection. See e.g. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68.
133. MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (CANADA), ONTARIO LAW REFORM COM-
MISSION: REPORT ON HUMAN ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION AND RELATED MATrERS (1985).
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added burden of coordinating their exercise under conditions of relative dis-
order. The illegitimate child, for example, clearly has a moral status, and
should have the legal status as well, for demanding support from its
parents. 134
The approach of the Ontario Law Reform Commission, which purports to
restore order to the procreative area by providing for the legal enforcement
of judicially supervised surrogacy contracts, represents a quite serious
breach of this principle. Although an understandable response to disorder, it
amounts to the legal suppression of inalienable moral status, and thus, to an
even greater disorder on the moral level. Its recommendation would ensure
not the rule of law, but, in fact, implicit systematic violence.
The genetic parent and child relationship gives rise to natural rights and
duties which the law must coordinate, but which the law did not create and
may not suppress. Similarly, the covenant between a rearing parent and a
child, even in cases in which the parties are not genetically related, such as
adoption, gives rise to moral rights and duties, which the law must coordi-
nate, but not suppress. 135 The central illustration of such a rearing bond
and covenant is the bond between mother and child during gestation. This tie
has moral meaning beyond the mother's simple genetic relationship with the
child. If forced to choose among the elements of parenthood, disintegrated
by the new reproductive technologies, I would say that this is society's most
primal and inalienable bond. Whether or not genetically related to her child,
the gestational mother has parental rights which merit legal protection.1
36
Since time immemorial, the rights of genetic parents in the rearing of a
child have, on occasion, come into conflict. 137 However, such conflicts are
not resolvable by contract, because the rights involved are not created by the
intentions of the parties, but flow rather from the nature of the human per-
son. Custody disputes, therefore, ordinarily are resolved in keeping with eq-
uitable principles to which the law appeals in coordinating conflicting rights
when the natural coordinating function of the family breaks down.138 In our
134. The UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, for example, specifies that
"everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without dis-
tinction of... birth or other status." UNITED NATIONS, supra note 128, at Art. 2.
135. This covenant is given recognition in much contemporary state law on child custody
by recognizing that the child's best interest is generally to remain with the adult with whom he
or she has forged a primary covenantal bond. An influential work in this development is J.
GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (2d ed.
1979). An illustrative case is Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152 (1966).
136. For a supporting opinion, see S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, supra note 5, at 238-39.
137. Rules for resolving such conflicts have varied. Under Roman law, for example, the
patria potestas resolved conflicts in favor of the father. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN Xxxviii-
xxxix (Sandars trans. 1941).
138. See In re Baby M, 217 N.J.Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128.
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time, events have led to the new possibility of conflict between the rights of a
gestational mother and the rights of a genetic father, or even a separate ge-
netic mother. Where society cannot prevent such conflicts from arising, jus-
tice requires that they be resolved according to equitable principles which
coordinate the rights of all, in keeping with the best interests of the child.139
As between the genetic parent and the gestational mother, the gestational
mother's rights ought generally to be given a certain preference. The
grounds for this preference include, but are not limited to, the moral priority
of covenant over lineage and the importance to society of the gestational
bond. Based on similar reasoning, Australia's Waller Commission recom-
mended that the gestational mother enjoy, in every case, the irrebuttable
presumption of legal maternity 40
The law ought to foster the health of the integral family. But, when the
integral family breaks down, the law ought to continue to give full recogni-
tion to the subsidiary elements of natural moral status found in "parent,"
"child of parent" and, to the extent relevant, "spouse." The welfare of chil-
dren must be sought within this residual moral framework. The law may
not, without losing its moral legitimacy, introduce alternative forms of or-
ganization such as those grounded in contractual intention which serve to
suppress these moral elements.
Ill. GENERIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A CIVIL LAW RESPONSE TO
THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
Based on the principles and facts discussed thus far, several generic rec-
ommendations can be advanced to guide the response of lawmakers to the
new reproductive technologies. My recommendations touch on the follow-
ing interrelated questions: (1) the status of the embryo; (2) the rights and
welfare of the embryo; (3) the status of marriage; (4) the status of the genetic
bond; (5) the rights and welfare of natural parents and children; (6) the sta-
tus of gestational mother; and (7) the rights of the gestational mother.
1. STATUS OF THE EMBRYO: The legal personhood of the embryo
ought to be recognized from the moment of conception. In assigning personal
status, any distinctions between embryos based on individual characteris-
tics, such as sex, stage of development, or genetic traits are invidious dis-
criminations, tend to undercut the moral underpinnings of the legal system
as a whole. The recommendation, made by the Warnock Committee of
139. The best interest of the child is the factor generally used to break ties when parental
rights are in conflict. For the application of this principle in the context of the new reproduc-
tive technologies, see Krause, supra note 17, at 192.
140. S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, supra note 5, at 236.
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Great Britain and the Waller Commission of Australia, that protection
should be granted embryos against nontherapeutic experimentation and de-
struction only upon their reaching the fourteenth day from conception, is
not acceptable. 41 The fourteen-day line of demarcation which they draw,
based on evidence of "individuation," cannot support the juridical weight
placed upon it.
14 2
The advent of extracorporeal embryos in this context shifts the locus of
the discussion of embryotic status away from abortion. It should not be
overlooked that this shift presents an opportunity for improving the level of
the public debate. There are two grounds for this: (1) the shift separates the
question of personhood from the separate question of resolving a particular
conflict between a woman's perceived interests and those of the child;' 43 and
(2) it definitively defeats the idea that the event of birth is an adequate defini-
tion of personhood.'4
At present, in the United States, there is no accepted basis for defining the
grounds for recognition of legal personhood. The danger, as an ever more
alarming train of events begins to show,'45 is that personhood will eventually
141. For a general discussion of the content of the Recommendations, see, Smith, Procrea-
tional Autonomy v. State Intervention: Opportunity or Crisis for a Brave New World?, 2 NOTRE
DAME J. LAW, ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 635, 645-46 (1986).
142. Sherman Elias and George Annas state: "Until the basis of the 14-day limit is more
clearly articulated and publicly accepted, it cannot serve as a legitimate regulatory boundary.
Are we concerned with what the embryo is, what it looks like or what it feels? Or are we
concerned with what it will be, or what it will never have a chance to be, or with what it will
look like or feel? Or is the focus of our concern something else entirely?" S. ELIAS & G.
ANNAS, supra note 5, at 227.
143. Whether the fetus is a person is a separate question from that of whether the mother's
desire to terminate gestation should override the fetus' right to life. Judith Jarvis Thomson's
well-known defense of abortion analogizes the fetus to a violinist, a member of society whose
personhood is hardly contested. Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 47
(1971).
Of course, the child, unlike a random violinist, is owed a parental duty by the mother, so
that Thomson's analogy is not persuasive on the ultimate question of whose "rights" should
prevail in the abortion dilemma.
144. Justice Blackmun in Roe v. Wade held that the developing human individual even if
viable, has no rights prior to birth and if its welfare prior to that time can be protected at all, it
is only based on the state's interest in "potential life." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 113. Practi-
cally speaking, the decision implies or has been taken to imply that personhood begins at birth.
The new reproductive technologies, through the possible advent of "ectogenesis," open the
possibility that some persons will make the transition to personhood, as had MacDuff in
Shakespeare's MacBeth ("[O]ne not of woman born" SHAKESPEARE, MacBeth, in THE COM-
PLETE WORKS OF SHAKESPEARE 1070 (Craig & Bevington eds. 1973)), without ever having
been "born." In any event, these technologies originate extracorporeal embryos whose status
must be determined without any reference to the possibility of birth.
145. Among such events, I would classify the trial level opinion in In re "Baby M," 217
N.J.Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128, advocacy of commercial use of the tissues of aborted fetuses,
and the preparation of live anencephalic babies for organ harvesting. The cause of the alarm
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be defined as a status having no deeper basis than an elective legal conferral.
There is an urgent present need to cement a consensus on the necessity of
grounding legal personhood in some fundamental aspect of human nature.
The Church is correct that the only truly defensible basis for recognizing
legal personhood is conception. 146 At the same time, the Church might wish
to see relative value in positions which, at least, posit that some other thresh-
old of human development, whether individuation, brain birth, sentience, or
viability, grounds legal personhood morally. In addition to challenging
those who hold such positions to move towards conception as a more defen-
sible line of demarcation, the Church should urge such proponents consist-
ently to apply whatever threshold they advance. This would include
refusing to carve out exceptions which would deny protection to the
handicapped. 147
Where acknowledgment of embryotic personhood is not forthcoming, sec-
ondary arguments should be made that embryos merit recognition at least as
"protopersons" because of the respect due generally to the origins of human
beings. 148 The argument that human origins should be respected even when
personhood may not be considered present is useful in offsetting frequently
encountered arguments that prior legal restraint on the circumstances of
conception cannot be based in the rights of the child who does not yet exist,
and who will not come to exist unless the circumstances are left
unrestrained. 14
9
Unfortunately, under present conditions, it is not enough to advocate per-
sonal or "protopersonal" protection for the embryo. Arguments are even
more urgently necessary that the embryo ought to be denied the status of
personal property. Such property treatment is a present fact, and its legal
recognition is a present danger.' 50 For this reason, the Warnock Committee
lies in the combined foreseeable consequences for basic human values together with certain
indications that there may be an absence of "brakes," in the form of insight and commitment
by courts, legislatures, and the general populace. See Neuhaus, Nihilism Without the Abyss:
Law, Rights, and Transcendent Good, 5 J. LAW & RELIG. 53, 56 (1988).
146. VATICAN INSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 2.
147. A certain trend towards greater legal recognition for the rights of handicapped per-
sons has been matched by a trend on some fronts invidiously to discriminate against handi-
capped persons based on quality of life and other criteria. See generally Destro, supra note 44.
148. Robertson, supra note 6, at 974-75, citing 2 J. FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS 56-57 (1985) and Ozar, The Case Against Thaw-
ing Unused Frozen Embryos, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 7, 10-12 (1985).
149. Id. at 992.
150. Unregulated dominion permitted over extracorporeal embryos and fetuses constitutes
treatment as property. See, e.g., L. Mettler and H.W. Michelman, Chromosome Studies of
Early Human Embryos: Proof of Fertilization in Uncleaved Human Oocytes in In Vitro Fertili-
zation and Embryo Transfer (M. Seppala and R.G. Edwards eds. 1985) (describing experimen-
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recommended that no one should be allowed to have a property interest in a
human embryo. 1 ' Legally enforced treatment as property subject to
purchase, sale, and dominion under contract is a decidedly less favorable
status than mere nonrecognition as a person. No one should have a property
interest in an embryo, and the sale or other commercial transfer of an embryo
should be prohibited.
Whether the law recognizes the embryo as a person suffering from the
"legal incapacity" of a minor child (the Catholic position)' 52 or as a
"protoperson" which is at least shielded from status as personal property,' 5 3
the embryo must be protected by clear rules keeping it under the continu-
ous154 protection of a responsible guardian both in vivo and in vitro. Where
the law is unable to exclude extracorporeal conceptions and where no parent
is available, the scientific or medical personnel who have temporary custody
over the embryo should be required to observe guardianship standards. 55
2. THE RIGHTS AND WELFARE OF THE EMBRYO: The human
embryo ought to be accorded legal protection against actions compromising
its life or its physical and moral integrity on the ground that it is a human
person. But, abstract recognition of such rights and status is not adequate
protection for the embryo's welfare. A legal construct of status and rights
protecting the extracorporeal embryo cannot be expected to work unless it is
relied upon in only the exceptional case. Even if such a construct is adopted,
it will be eroded and probably eventually fall, if the opportunity for mastery
over one so weak and difficult to see as the extracorporeal embryo is made
widespread. The uninterrupted preservation of the gestational bond is the
only sufficient protection for the embryo's concrete rights and welfare. Ex-
tracorporeal conceptions should, therefore, be discouraged, if they cannot be
prohibited outright. 15
6
tal use of one-celled and other human embryos obtained through in vitro fertilization). Legal
recognition is being advocated by same. See Andrews, supra note 42, at 37.
151. WARNOCK COMMITTEE, supra note 7, at 56.
152. Under law, children are recognized as persons, but are seen as suffering from legal
incapacity until they reach majority. They cannot bind themselves irrevocably by contract, J.
MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 12 (1974), and, in legal process, they require representa-
tion by a guardian ad litem Veazey v. Veazey, 560 P.2d 382 (Alaska 1977).
153. See supra note 148.
154. There should not be any "window" of choice about whether to confer reified, as op-
posed to personal status on a developing human life.
155. The protection of a particular embryo should not depend on "parental" intention, nor
should the "research" intentions of a custodian alter the protocol for how custody is to be
observed.
156. The VATICAN INSTRUCTION does not specifically mention the simple case of IVF
among the technologies which ought to be prohibited by law. VATICAN INSTRUCTION supra
note 1, at 20. Some believe it probable that the United States Supreme Court would hold the
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If general popular sympathy with the aspirations of infertile couples
means that IVF cannot be outlawed,157 every precaution should be taken to
ensure that IVF remains the exceptional procedure. The delivery of IVF
services should be limited to the context of medical treatment, available only
upon a showing of infertility."'8 Minimal conditions for the protection of
prospective children should also be required. The couple should be restricted
to those in an intact marriage.' 59 The physician should be required to meet
a regulatory burden of showing that the extracorporeal safety of the embryo
is ensured."eo On this basis, the conception of spares, the culling of un-
desirables, and the storage of frozen embryos ought to be prohibited.
The public funding of IVF ought to be prohibited for at least two reasons.
The practice offends the moral beliefs of many in society,' 61 and its funding
would contradict distributive justice to other societal needs, in view of the
elective nature of the procedure and its very high expense. 162 Since the
scope of IVF should be strictly limited to the treatment of infertility, eugen-
ics and experimental research should be strictly excluded by law. Opportu-
nism by those pursuing these ends should be vigorously excluded.
3. STATUS OF MARRIAGE: Legal recognition of the family as an
integral unit requires a renewed legal commitment to the institution of mar-
riage as the exclusive positive organizing principle based on individual
choice for coordinating rights and duties in the procreative arena. Contract
obligation ought to be strictly excluded, as a basis of rights and duties, in
connection with gamete donation, embryo donation, gestational "services" and
child custody. 163 Where family rules grounded in marriage do not operate
simple case of IVF between married people constitutionally beyond prohibition. Alternative
Reproductive Technologies, supra note 2 (statement of George J. Annas).
157. The methodology of, perhaps, the majority of recent writers on the legal response to
the new reproductive technologies relies on the probable demand for the technologies by a
growing infertile population as a starting point for analysis. See, e.g., Smith, Intimations of
Life: Extracorporeality and the Law, 21 GONZ. L. REV. 395 (1985-86).
158. Other socially negative applications would include "[u]se of the technology to gain
access to the embryo for research or genetic manipulation; avoidance of pregnancy for "con-
venience" of genetic mother; use of technique for eugenic purposes." S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS,
supra note 5, at 225 (Table 9-1).
159. Further reasoning in support of this conclusion, can be found in Krause, supra note
17, at 197-98.
160. This regulation should balance enforcement by both criminal sanctions, see recom-
mendations of the Warnock Committee, WARNOCK COMMITTEE supra note 7, at 66, and the
Vatican Instruction, VATICAN INSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 20, and peer and professional
censure. The Warnock Committee's recommendation of a permanent licensing board, WAR-
NOCK COMMITTEE, supra note 7, at 75 poses the serious danger that the government would be
viewed as condoning techniques which are morally objectionable to many.
161. L. ANDREWS, supra note 93, at 14.
162. Smith, supra note 157, at 397 n.21.
163. The enforcement of a contract to supply order to societal interaction under the new
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because marriage is absent, principles of equity should be used to coordinate
residual rights and duties. Several court decisions have responded to surro-
gacy contracts in this manner; most recently, the decision of the New Jersey
Supreme Court in In re Matter Baby "M."164
Ideally, deliberate third-party gamete donations would be prohibited as an
undue form of competition with marriage and as against the rights and wel-
fare of the parties. 163 However, the prevalence of AID and the impossibility
of enforcing laws against it militate against prohibition. Two hundred and
fifty thousand persons now living in the U.S. have been conceived by
AID. 166 AID is easily accomplished in the home, without medical media-
tion, as the numerous "baster" babies born in the United States every year
attest. 167
4. THE STATUS OF THE GENETIC BOND: Genetic parenthood
ought to be recognized as giving rise to "prima facie" rights and duties which
may not be alienated by contract. Gamete donors should be included as the
subjects of such rights and duties. Rights and duties accompanying the sta-
tus of genetic parenthood should be waivable, or terminable by state parens
patriae recognition, but only as equity permits. 168 Fees for gamete donation
should be prohibited, as commercializing basic human relationships.
169
The outright prohibition of gamete donation would be a valid legal goal, if
it was enforceable. By removing fees and leaving prima facie parental duties
intact, it is at least possible to limit the practice to cases which are least
societally damaging.170 Because the only rationale publicly advanced in sup-
reproductive technologies has been proposed for these purposes. Robertson, supra note 6, at
1003.
164. In re Baby M, 14 Farn L. Rep 2007 (1988).
165. The Vatican Instruction recommends such a prohibition. VATICAN INSTRUCTION,
supra note 1, at 20.
166. Annas, Fathers Anonymous: Beyond the Best Interests of the Sperm Donor, 14 FAMILY
LAW Q. 1-13 (1980).
167. Robertson, supra note 6, at 1004.
168. If drafted with care, waiver and termination might, by statute, automatically accom-
pany certain acts showing abandonment or personal disregard for offspring. Such acts might
include donation of gametes under legally regulated medical supervision. The recognition of
the rights of the genetic parent does not require the elimination of the presumption of legiti-
macy accompanying marriage, but it does require renewed discussion of the meaning and lim-
its of the presumption.
169. For a discussion of the societally negative aspects of "sperm vending," see S. ELIAS &
G. ANNAS, supra note 5, at 227-28.
170. The least societally damaging instances would be ones where the personal nature of
the contribution by the gamete donor is recognized. Such a recognition would tend to follow
from acknowledgement that the contribution cannot be bought, but must be truly donated,
and that it is a contribution to the prospective child (lineage) rather than to the facilitator or
the rearing parents.
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port of gamete donation is infertility, the application of AID and ovum do-
nation for eugenic purposes and sex selection should be prohibited by law.
Government funding ought to be denied because the practice is morally un-
acceptable to many. Regulation for the health of the participants should be
carefully designed to avoid the appearance of state approval.
71
5. THE RIGHTS OF NATURAL PARENTS AND CHILDREN:
The rights of genetic parents in their children include a prima facie right to
rear the child. This rearing right should not be waivable or terminable ex-
cept by state procedures which are duly informed by equitable regard for the
parent and by concern for the best interests of the child. Such rights should
also be subject, where appropriate, to coordination in accordance with the
preemptive status of the marital relationship. 1
72
Genetic children should have a nonwaivable right to knowledge about their
genetic lineage. In cases of third-party procreative arrangements, this means
that the child should have controlled access to records showing the genetic
background and even the identity of the donor. The scope of anonymity
should be defined primarily by reference to the best interests of the child. 1
73
Deliberate action within a third-party procreative arrangement to disguise
the lineage of the child should be criminalized. 
74
6. THE STATUS OF THE GESTATIONAL MOTHER: The gesta-
tional mother's covenantal relationship with her child should give her legal
status as mother, whether or not she is genetically related to the child. Ideally,
however, gestation by a mother not the genetic mother should be prohibited
by law because the conflict this practice causes places more weight on the
legal construct of rights and duties in this area than it can reasonably be
expected to bear. 175 Any donation of gestational "services" by the genetic
mother ought also to be prohibited as far as is practicable because it causes a
171. The transmission of venereal disease to the woman accepting AID is a significant
possibility. Negative consequences are heightened in view of the AIDS epidemic. Artificial
Insemination and AIDS, supra note 18, at 16. (Four Australian women infected with AIDS
virus through AID). Present screening procedures are generally inadequate and should be
improved. Mascola & Guinan, Screening to Reduce Transmission of Sexually Transmitted Dis-
eases in Semen Used for Artificial Insemination, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354 (1986). On the
danger of the popular interpretation of government regulation as societal approval, see S.
ELIAS & G. ANNAS, supra note 5, at 230 (regarding surrogate motherhood).
172. For example, through the presumption of legitimacy which accompanies marriage.
Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1975).
173. Annas, supra note 166, at 11.
174. An unmarried woman who is an ordained Episcopal priest reported in the Washing-
ton Post that, in arranging the artificial insemination of a daughter, she mixed sperm samples
from three men, to disguise the paternity of the child so that the girl's genetic father could
never attempt to relate to the child. A need examined, a prayer fulfilled; unmarried priest bears
child by artificial insemination, Wash. Post, Dec. 7, 1987, at Al, col. 1
175. S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, supra note 5, at 227.
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woman to conceive a child she does not wish to love unconditionally and
because, for this and other reasons, it is against the welfare of children. Fees
for gestational "services" should, in any case, be prohibited, as commercial-
izing basic human relationships.76
7. THE RIGHTS OF THE GESTATIONAL MOTHER: The gesta-
tional mother, whether or not the genetic mother, should have a prima facie
right to rear the child. Such rights should not be waivable or terminable
until childbirth is past. Where society is unable to prevent the division of
gestational from genetic motherhood, the rights of the gestational mother
should take precedence over those of the genetic mother, based on the moral
priority of covenant over lineage and the societal importance of the gesta-
tional bond.
1 77
IV. PRACTICAL CONSTRAINTS IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE UNITED STATES
Catholic jurisprudential doctrine recognizes that even once a general re-
view of the facts has permitted judgment about the generic requirements of
the public order, further prudential assessment is needed to determine what
legal forms will most effectively realize the ideal of justice under existing
circumstances. 171 Such circumstances have been recognized in Church
teaching to include: 1) the requirements of the positive system of law, in-
cluding the written constitution 7 9 and the structure of government; 8 °
2) the level of voluntary compliance which can be expected, since the law
may not make the threat of force its primary ground of effectiveness;' and
3) the duty to take into account costs to other rights indirectly caused by
enforcement. 8 2
Requirements of the Existing Legal System
As part of the Anglo-American tradition, the United States legal system
places great importance on precedent in defining and applying principle.
8 3
The generic recommendations I have proposed from a Roman Catholic per-
176. The commercialization of basic human procreative and rearing relationships has long
been recognized as against public policy. FARNSWORTH, supra note 46, at 88.
177. For a general discussion of the moral significance of "covenant" in the context of
procreation, see P. RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN 32-42 (1970).
178. JOHN XXIII, supra note 4, § 68 at 141.
179. Id. § 76 at 143.
180. PASTORAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, § 74 at 285.
181. JOHN XXIII, supra note 4, § 48 at 136.
182. Id. § 62 at 139.
183. This is the doctrine of stare decisis. See generally, G. CHRISTIE, Text and Readings on
Jurisprudence: The Philosophy of Law 961-1050 (1973).
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spective can influence the shape of civil law only if shown to be supported by
United States legal precedents. There are, in fact, ample precedents to sup-
port my recommendations in the received law on both families and the prac-
tice of medicine, as the New Jersey Supreme Court ruling in the In re Baby
"M" case showed. 18 4 The challenge is to show that the case of the new
reproductive technologies ought to be decided in continuity with these
precedents. Because of the novel appearance of the technologies, the danger
exists that lawmakers will depart from the principles embodied in traditional
precedent. Since there is doubt about continuity with precedent, legislation,
and not just judicial decision, is necessary to ensure that the new case comes
into alignment with inherited principles.
A negative precedent of considerable concern is a fifteen year recent his-
tory of abortion on demand. 8 5 As long as this practice cannot be stopped, it
is essential that it, at least, be given an interpretation which neutralizes its
application in the context of the new reproductive technologies.' 18 6 The pub-
lic justification, given the nation's present permissive abortion law is the wo-
man's "right" not to continue with the burden of gestation. 8 7 Even if the
precedent is not reversed, all that it should be seen as deciding, for the in-
terim, is that in a conflict, the woman's interest prevails. No express judg-
ment has been made on the child's status.
In order to restrict the impact of the precedent of abortion, care must be
given to refuting highly developed alternative interpretations of the abortion
precedent, which, at present, are being advanced with an eye toward placing
the new reproductive technologies entirely beyond meaningful legal re-
straint.'8 8 These interpretations hold that, through Roe v. Wade and related
decisions, the United States Supreme Court has defined a constitutional
"right of procreative autonomy" that prevents any legal interference in
human reproductive arrangements.' 8 9 It is argued that this "procreative
right" requires the state to enforce third-party contracts for the donation of
184. In re Baby "M," 14 Fam. L. Rep. 2007 (1988). Such alignment is in order not because
the principles are "inherited," but because they are in accord with what experience has shown
basic human values require. Legislatures are currently being besieged with numerous conflict-
ing proposals. Note, supra note 14, at 188 n.6. It is essential that extended public debate and
informed legislative debate precede enactments.
185. Since Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
186. Precedents do not apply where the case at hand is distinguishable. In deciding
whether cases are distinguishable, the court is necessarily "interpreting" the law with reference
to basic societal values. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 45-86 (1986).
187. See G. CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 114 (1985).
188. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 6, at 954-67.
189. In addition to Roe, other key cases relevant to this line of analysis include: Carey v.
Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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gametes, embryos, gestational "services," and, perhaps, even children. 190
The right may be said to remove eugenic and sex selection procedures from
the scope of governmental control, as well as any scientific research on em-
bryos, which may extend the technical scope of the new technologies.' 91 In
theory, the right may eventually also be extended to prevent the law from
interfering with a mother's disposal of an embryo or fetus she has chosen to
abort, allowing the commercial sale of fetuses and fetal body parts for organ
harvesting. 
192
This alternative interpretation of the abortion precedent capitalizes on the
apparent novelty of the new reproductive technologies for the sake of urging
the severance of the case from resolution under sound principles embodied
in much of traditional family law. It is by a comprehensive ideology that
gives the deceptive appearance of easy answers to hard questions. The pro-
fessional class of lawyers and brokers who stand to gain if procreative and
rearing relationships are commercialized is made vulnerable by self-interest
to assuming a role as the vehicle which transports this interpretation and
ideology into law.19
The Necessary Extent of Voluntary Compliance
A second fundamental circumstance to be considered in shaping specific
policy proposals is the extent of voluntary compliance, which a law can be
expected to receive. At the present time, conditions are, I believe, favorable
for positive steps to reaffirm the centrality of the traditional family. 94 If
effective communication is employed, they may also be favorable for elimi-
nating commercialized procreative practices.' 9 The entrenched status of
AID, the prevalence of single-parent households, and a bias in favor of indi-
vidual freedom make voluntary compliance with restrictions on noncom-
mercialized donations of third-party gametes, perhaps, less likely.' 96
Indirect Costs
In framing specific recommendations one final circumstance which must
be considered is indirect costs to the rights of third-parties. In the case of
190. Robertson, supra note 6, at 1002-23.
191. Id.
192. See generally Andrews, supra note 41 (discussing the commercial sale of patient's
body parts and products).
193. Id. at 961, 977, and 982.
194. The most dramatic contemporary condition is the current epidemic of acquired im-
mune deficiency syndrome ("AIDS"). Consequently, there is the general recommendation that
people restrict sexual relations to relationships which are long-term and monogamous.
195. See Krause, supra note 17, at 188.
196. Robertson, supra note 6, at 1001-02.
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the new reproductive technologies, any restraint relying on the use of penal-
ties against parents is likely to do indirect harm to children. It follows that
enforcement of restraints in this area should, as a rule, be by means other
than penalties against parents. Moreover, any rule placing a gestational
mother on the wrong side of the law would make her vulnerable to extortion
and "underground" enslavement for the period of her gestation.197 As a
result, enforcement devices should be framed to ensure gestational mothers,
regardless of most particular circumstances, with good standing before the
law. Penalties should be aimed primarily at third-party brokers and other
professionals. 198
V. SPECIFIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this article was to justify and prescribe the appropriate
scope of the civil law's intervention in the area of the new reproductive tech-
nologies. Finally, it aimed to arrive at prescriptions which were concrete
and specific. Such prescriptions were to be grounded in broader generic pre-
scriptions justified by reference to Catholic principles on the legitimation of
law, as well as in an assessment of relevant practical constraints. The article
has set out its generic prescriptions, elaborated their justification under
Catholic moral reasoning, and made an assessment of relevant practical con-
straints. In order to conclude the article, it remains only to state concrete
and specific policy prescriptions for the legal response to each of the new
reproductive technologies described at the outset of the article.
The specific recommendations which follow are offered to the political
community, from the perspective of a particular faith community, Roman
Catholicism. Within this- faith community, the Sacred Congregation's
timely and courageous Instruction, referred to several times above, remains
the measure of public policy recommendations in this difficult area. In the
political community, every proposal, from whatever quarter, obviously
needs to be tested for its moral and political wisdom under the circum-
stances. The concrete recommendations that follow are intended as a point
of departure for further reflection and judgment both within the community
of faith and the political community at large.
Concretely, the appropriate legal response to each of the relevant new re-
productive technologies would appear to be as follows:
1. IVF: In the event that IVF cannot be outlawed, the .procedure should
197. An illustration is available in the case of Alejandra Munoz a Mexican woman who
was kept confined in the house of a California sperm donor for the duration of her pregnancy.
Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1987, supra note 2, (statement of Alejandra Munoz).
198. For reasoning in support of this proposal, see Krause, supra note 17, at 200.
New Reproductive Technologies
be legally restricted to stable married couples who suffer from infertility. No
extracorporeal embryo should be created by the process which is not also
transferred for gestation. Eugenic and sex selection should be prohibited.
Governmental funding should be denied.1 99
2. SURROGATE EMBRYO TRANSFER: Surrogate Embryo Transfer
should be legally prohibited as the endangerment of an embryo in a "safe
haven," and because it undercuts the integral parental role and identity.2°
The prohibition is enforceable because of the necessary mediation of a
physician.
3. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION BY DONOR: State laws existing in
about half the states require revision to reflect a change from a contract to an
informed consent model.20 1 Fees for donation should be prohibited. Eu-
genic uses, including the Nobel Prize Winners' Sperm Bank, should be out-
lawed.2 ° 2 Disguising a child's lineage should be criminalized. Provision
should be made for record maintenance and for screening for diseases. Gov-
ernment funding should be denied.
4. OVUM DONATION: The legal treatment of ovum donation should
probably be the same as that for AID.20 3
5. SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: Commercial surrogacy should be
banned and brokerage and advertising for surrogates should be criminalized.
The gestational mother should have an irrebuttable presumption of legal ma-
ternity, which should not be subject to waiver until after childbirth has
passed. Contracts should be void as against public policy.
2 °
6. GESTATIONAL "SERVICES" WITHOUT GENETIC CONTRIBU-
TION ("WOMB RENTAL"): This practice should be prohibited because it
undercuts the societal ideal of the integrated parental role and identity. The
prohibition is enforceable because of the need for a mediating physician.20 5
7. EXPERIMENTATION AND TISSUE DONATION: All nonthera-
199. See notes 161-162 and accompanying text.
200. S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, supra note 5, at 231.
201. Andrews, supra note 12, at 54-55 (1984).
202. This sperm bank, founded by Robert Klark Graham, is mentioned in L. ANDREWS,
supra note 93, at 93.
203. Although physician mediation is required for ovum donation making it feasible to
subject the procedure to legal restriction, once AID is tolerated there would not seem to be any
reasoned basis for excluding the similar case of ovum donation.
204. For the approach of the New Jersey Supreme Court, see In re Baby M, 14 Fam. L.
Rep. 2007 (1988).
205. Just as there are limits on the state's ability to enforce the exclusive recognition given
to the institution of marriage, there are limits on the state's ability to defend the integrity of the
parental role. But, like marriage, the integral parental role merits protection as the societal
ideal. In the case of "womb rental," exclusion of the practice would seem to be well within the
prudential limits of protection.
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peutic experimentation on and tissue donation from human embryos ought
to be strictly prohibited, as required by the standard rules on informed con-
sent governing research on and medical treatment of human beings. 2°6 Im-
portant facets of this topic can be expected to come to the United States
Congress for review during 1988.207
The sale of tissues from dead embryos and fetuses should be prohibited by
extension of existing federal law outlawing the sale of human organs.208
Women who have aborted, parents who have abandoned extracorporeal em-
bryos, and physicians who have assisted in such abortion or abandonment
should be denied the right to decide the fate of tissues of embryos and fetuses
whose interest they have violated.2"
8. ARTIFICIAL WOMBS AND ASEXUAL REPRODUCTION: The
law should strictly prohibit all means of reproduction which would deprive a
child of two genetic parents and the gestational relationship. Governmental
funding for development should be denied.21°
CONCLUSION
In connection with the new reproductive technologies, the next decade
will decide the law's response to questions of profound significance for basic
human values. Like the dilemma of nuclear arms, this moral problem is one
of virtually unprecedented and historic proportions. Technological power,
in both cases, outspeeds the pace of inherited moral and legal forms. Under
the circumstances, moral choices are thrust upon society. These choices
need not and ought not, however, to be resolved in a way that denies society
its humanity. Properly made, such choices can deepen both society's com-
mitment to the inalienable dignity of the human person and the legitimacy of
law as an instrument for serving the common good.
206. Medical treatment and scientific research may not be imposed on a person without
voluntary consent after full disclosure. G. Annas, Informed Consent, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF
MEDICINE: SELECTED Topics IN THE CLINICAL SCIENCES (1978). The embryo and fetus, like
the minor suffering from legal incapacity, is not capable of giving the required consent.
207. The three year moratorium on the possibility of governmental waiver on a prohibition
of federally funded fetal experimentation under the Health Research Extension Act of 1985
lapses in 1988. 42 U.S.C. § 289(g) (Supp. 1987).
208. See, e.g., National Organ Transplant Act of 1984. 42 U.S. 271(e) (Supp. 1987).
209. For reasoning in support of this proposal, see position of Arthur L. Caplan, Director
of the Center for Biomedical Ethics at the University of Minnesota. The Selling of Body Parts,
supra note 45, at 33.
210. While the use of artificial wombs would have the potential for rescuing unborn chil-
dren subjected to abortion or the accident of miscarriage, the development of these means
would appear to require research violating the rights and welfare of existing embryos.
